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NON-CULPABLE IGNORANCE
AND JUST WAR THEORY*
Abstract: The so called “non-culpable ignorance” is an instrument to justify
participating in a war on a defeated side, on condition that fighters sincerely believe
that they are defending a just cause and had some valid reasons to believe in having a
chance to win. Within the just war theory this instrument is needed to make both sides
prima facie right, otherwise the theory would imply that those who lose are guilty in
advance, especially if they are the weaker side. However, in contemporary context of
criminalizing war the very concept of war is changing and becoming extremely va-
gue. As wars are more and more “asymmetric”, just war theory might face serious
challenges regarding incorporation of “non-culpable ignorance” within its scope,
as well as difficulties in showing that justice goes with the victory, opening thus the
issues of articulation of a just peace.
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The topic I am going to talk is not a pleasurable one, and also
– contrary to glorious tone prevailing in literature regarding this
topic – not honorable, not at all: there is nothing honorable in war,
indeed. In fact, there is a hidden supposition here: in honoring war,
war is always taken as something in the past. It seems virtually im-
possible to honor some future war. This clearly reflects a crucial fea-
ture of war, which is a part of its definition: war is, according to its
very nature, something temporary, something that should pass and
end, better sooner than later. War cannot be conceived as a perma-
nent state of affairs (although a permanent war can be a part of a pol-
icy – a vicious policy we may say – of some powerful state; there are
examples in history of states living in a double-state of peace in cen-
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* A lecture delivered at the Portland State University’s Tour the World at
Home This Summer, Free Lecture Series, on July 25, 2007. I wish to thank Dawn
White, director of International Office at the PSU for the invitation to give this lecture
and to the Philosophy Department and its chair, Grant Farr, for inviting me to come
and teach a course in “Ethics of War” during the PSU Summer Session.
tre, or inside, and a permanent war on its borders, or outside; but
even then war is to be conceived as temporary at any particular point
in space and time).
Peace, of course, can and should be permanent, peace is the
home of life (if I am allowed to use this metaphor). This is obvious.
But there is nothing obvious for philosophers, and we have to ask
Why it is so? Philosophers cannot be satisfied with something just
stated, and even less with preaching of any kind – they are trying to
explain or, if this is not affordable as sometimes is the case, then to
understand the phenomena they explore. They usually do this by us-
ing conceptual distinctions which sometimes may seem to be ab-
stract and far from the reality, but that’s only an impression, coming
probably from their refusal to preach or advocate or take any side in
advance. They respect only the power of arguments, not taking for
anything for granted - no goal, no purpose, and no value, before it
goes through the rigor of those arguments. So, true as it is, the thesis
that peace is home of life is not an explanation of anything: after all
we have peace in graveyards (and an eternal one at that), places asso-
ciated more with war than peace, and there is no life there.1 So to an-
swer the question: What makes peace valuable, for our purposes
here and phrased in the shortest way, is that peace is giving us con-
trol of time: it is predictability that we attain by peace. If we define
life as the activity of setting goals and attempting to realize them
(again a very short and succinct definition – but sharp and precise
one!), then it is obvious that life is future oriented and dependent on
(some) capacity to control our future time. This is what laws give to
us. Laws require, and are dependent on, peace. The main part of the
definition of war corroborates this: it is per definition a suspension, a
temporary suspension, of some important laws, and for that matter
some important rights and liberties. There is no controlled future in
war as the immediate future of our life, it looks more as if the future
resided in one single point, or after that point, and that point is the
end of war – the point of victory or defeat, and of established peace.
By giving us control of (future) time, peace is a central issue
of social power, and an expression of its articulation and structure.
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1 Cf. I. Kant, Zum ewigen Friede (Toward Perpetual Peace, 1975), in: I. Kant,
Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 1999, p/ 317.
So why not just proclaim peace as the supreme value and accept the
position of pacifism? Peace movements are based in a need, or de-
sire, to defend against violence – however, as such, peace move-
ments do not proclaim anything regarding the articulation of power
or its structure. The only demand is that violence, i.e. power, should
not be used in any case: any power at all, because any power would
become violence by being used, should be abolished. That’s why
peace movements make themselves irrelevant: they do not deal with
peace, as a state of affairs and as a matter of controlling the future;
instead, they are concerned only with a certain feature of one of its
pre-conditions, power. Power is however a crucial component or in-
gredient within the instruments of controlling the future. It consists
of a combination of two factors: possessing the means (resources) to
attain a certain end, and possessing the will (determination) to use
those means to realize that end. (Power of work is one obvious ex-
ample of this). Without the power to realize it, an end would not be a
set end but something else, an imagined, desired, fantasized, or con-
ceived end. Its realization would not be an opportunity, something
belonging to the inventory of possible achievements (it would not
be, at least potentially, in the future time – it won’t be in any time at
all – but only in a-temporal (eternal?) sphere of what has been con-
ceived or imagined, fantasized). Power entails, as its essential part,
the capacity of efficient predictability, usually articulated as a cer-
tainty or high probability of succeeding in realizing a set end. Power
has the same structure as laws, or rules, whose existence consists
precisely in this overcoming the future time regarding future state of
affairs, which are not only projections and goals but are taken as
things that will certainly or very probably be realized. The regularity
of its articulation is what makes the value of peace. Pacifists how-
ever only seek the absence of violence, no matter what else might
there be at stake. Being not concerned with anything else but ab-
sence of violence, peace movements are not concerned with condi-
tions of peace, i.e. the articulation of rules of power (as a part of re-
sources which in a general distribution of means for possible ends
make a crucial part of life, individual and social).
Peace, however, if unjust, contains its own negation, and is a
structure that is unstable or a source of conflict, rather than a source
of stability. Complete security is not possible, and it seems that jus-
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tice provides the best if not only guarantor of peace. This is the cru-
cial point: wars are undertaken for reasons, and sometimes these rea-
sons are reasons of justice. In such cases wars could be justified, and
this is the main point in just war theory, according to which war, with
just intent, could vindicate justice. And indeed, it seems that we are
incapable of mass armed violence, which characterize any war, with-
out believing that there are some good reasons making our participa-
tion in the war just, not unjust. It seems virtually impossible, and it
probably never happened, that in any war a nation and its leaders as-
sert that they are not right while their enemies are.
On the other side, it seems that war might be morally an ap-
propriate remedy to redress some kinds of injustice. Anyway, in al-
lowing such a possibility a need for justification has been developed,
and this need finds its tentative solution in so called “just war the-
ory”. It is a theory which justifies war in terms of defense, or rather
self-defense, stating that defense is giving a morally satisfactory jus-
tification of war. Historically, just war theory was a product of Chris-
tian thought, at the point in which pacifistic “turning the other
cheek” policy was replaced with a policy of securing newly acquired
power, which we may call newly attained peace or a promise of it -
after Christians came to power in 4th century (as peace is, in essence,
the issue of power and its distribution). The theory, connected usu-
ally with St. Augustine, but developed and refined later, says that
war can be just if a certain set of conditions is satisfied, those condi-
tions being divided in two parts: jus ad bellum (a right to war), and
jus in bello (rights within the war). The second part is by far easier
than the first (because it takes the fact of war as supposed, justified
or not, and has not a problem to establish how war is possible at all).
It is dealing with restrictions in war activities: necessity, proportion,
and combatants/non-combatants delineation. The restrictions are not
always simple, nor it is a simple matter to define them. But the real
issue is with the first part, jus ad bellum. It states that war – starting
and waging a war – is morally justified if a set of conditions is ful-
filled. Originally, in Augustine and Aquinas, there were three such
conditions: 1) War should be waged for a just cause, 2) by “compe-
tent authority”, i. e. by a sovereign, and 3) with a right intention.
Later some other conditions were added: 4) that war should be the
last resort, taken after all other options are exhausted, 5) that there is
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a convincing probability that peace will be the result, i. e. that there
is a likelihood of victory (or at least a real possibility of it), 6) that to-
tal evil of the war cannot outweigh the good achieved by it.
There is a huge debate about “just war theory”, and it is some-
times described more as “just war tradition” than a “theory”. It is es-
pecially interesting in light of new phenomena in this area, like
“asymmetric wars” we are witnessing these days, where we have
two sides of incomparably different size and power, or in the light of
an approach in which we have a tendency to criminalize war – visi-
ble in theories of human rights and humanitarian military interven-
tions, in which war has been described in terms making it similar to
police action. All of these should somehow come under the umbrella
of just war theory approach. I think it is a natural course of events be-
cause the “theory” was devised from the outset to justify offensive
wars in terms of “defense”, introducing in the concept of “defense” a
logic according to which defense can mean not only defending forms
and places of life but also defending of whatever makes “our” sys-
tem of values. This “defense” can even occur independently of re-
strictions of territoriality, i.e. outside, sometimes very far away, from
the boundary of countries whose system of values has been endan-
gered. It became thus a defense of world as we see it, for example a
defense of “right faith”, or “true values” (not our values here and
now, but what we take as the only true values). Crusades and jihads
are natural consequence. And criminalization of war too – with an
implication of rejecting our enemies the right to defend themselves,
equalizing war with police action seems to be natural as well.
However, regardless of the firmness of our belief in our own
cause, there is still a question characterizing the very essence of war:
“Whether a war can be just on both sides?”, and after this: “How we
should treat “others”?” In absence of a world state, which could
“vindicate justice” in a formal and legal way in a sense in which all
“others” who are not obeying world laws (the laws of such a state)
would become criminals, we have to accept a very different view-
point from “just war theory”, one of war as a conflict between two
rights where victory has a constitutive role. This implies that our en-
emies are not to be considered to be criminals, and that (per supposi-
tion of “just war” clause, and our sincere belief in having the right to
wage the war in the first place) we are not to be considered as such by
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our enemies. As Americans had in Lieber’s Code, proclaiming (or
ordering, in fact) the treatment of Southerners not as “rebels” but as a
kind of captured soldiers of a warring party,2 so now we have the
same conceptual difficulties in treating others, when we treat our ac-
tions as “interventions”, as if they were police actions. However, in
treating “our enemies” as, in principle, protected by a right they fight
for, as a candidate for a legitimate right, we recognize them as, in
principle, equal. Even after a defeat they may be protected by pre-
sumption of defense: they sincerely believed that they are defending
a right cause. (And what can make a stronger case in this regard than
their sincere belief in self-defense?!) However, one side might in
fact be wrong, and this in two different senses: 1) in believing that
their cause is just, and 2) in believing that they have any chance to
win – and, at the same time, in both of these cases they can sincerely
believe what they believe and believe to have good reasons for their
beliefs. If this is the case, we would have “non-culpable ignorance”
because we cannot blame someone for fighting for something one
sincerely believe to have a right to fight for, and at the same time sin-
cerely and with good enough reasons believed to be in a position of
justified (self)defense, for example to counter an aggression. This
part of just war theory deserves to be explored in more detail, and
part of my work in ethics of war is devoted to this point.
Ignorance, of course, can be “culpable” (for example, if
self-afflicted), or if there is a justified supposition to not believe
what one believes. But if ignorance about the prospects of future
outcomes in cases of war was culpable, it would destroy the distinc-
tion between war and police action, between law and morality, and
would make all those who are defeated in any conflict criminals! It
would imply the end of political freedom – because it is impossible –
on the basis of our epistemological status in the universe: fallibility –
to predict with absolute certainty what the outcome finally will be:
who would make any decision on the terms that you will burn in hell
if your judgment turns out to be wrong? The very concepts of deci-
sion–making, responsibility-taking, risk-taking, and also of “deci-
sion”, “responsibility”, “risk”, “freedom” would lose their meaning
under such conditions.
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2 Cf. “General Orders No. 100”, April 24, 1863; cf. also F. Lieber’s “Guerrilla
Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War”, both in: R. Shel-
ley Hartigan, Lieber’s Code, Precedent Publishing, Inc., Chicago 1983.
There is another relevant point here: If there is a just war justi-
fication for a self-defense, this does not entail that there is an analo-
gous right to pursue – through war – any rational, rationally justified
interest of the state. This raises a question of difference in two kinds
of ignorance: ignorance regarding the result of defense and igno-
rance regarding the result of attacking (the one that, according to just
war theory, should not necessarily be designated as “aggression”, or
perhaps any attack with good prospects to win). If both of these
would be designated as “non-culpable ignorance” we would have
equally justifying non-culpable ignorance in defense and in partici-
pating in an aggressive war. I.e. your defense of your country with-
out knowing that you will lose in the end would be on the same foot
as if you were attacking for what you think is a right cause (or with a
good reasons to believe in victory) but without knowing that defend-
ers are determined not to surrender. In both cases sincerity, taken by
itself, is playing the same justificatory role in producing motivation
to act, but still – shouldn’t there be some difference here? Perhaps
the answer is positive; however there is still room for application of
non-culpable ignorance doctrine: even defeated aggressors should
not be treated as mere criminals if the war, no robbery or anything
similar has taken place. This is so precisely because in war igno-
rance of the end-result is really non-culpable. Unlike the case of
criminals, there is always room for a specific kind of reciprocity
here: both sides can expect reciprocity, in whatever they are doing,
implying that enemies deserve a kind of tolerance that criminals in
principle do not deserve. There is no expected reciprocity between
criminals and, say, police force, because the distribution of rights
and duties is quite different in the two cases. In case of criminals
there is no reciprocity possible and also no tolerance is allowed,
while in case of enemies reciprocity is to be expected on both sides,
and a kind of tolerance is needed and even necessary. (This might be
considered as a part of the definition of war).
Nearing the conclusion we may assert, however, that US pol-
icy is much closer to just war theory approach than to non-culpable
ignorance approach. It is perhaps most visible in doctrine of
non-negotiability, which characterizes American policy in last hun-
dred years (but we may safely say was based in American civil war).
It is visible also in a way US is treating world organizations like IMF,
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WB, or UN. In a way US treatment of the rest of the world is similar
how the North was treating South in Civil War. It is also visible in a
widespread thesis that democratic countries do not wage wars against
each other – implying that the presence of war is an indication that the
other side is not “democratic”. Eagerness in taking sides, and eager-
ness to jump to conclusions often without sufficient factual corrobo-
ration (and actually impatience in dealing sometimes with subtle fac-
tual issues, especially historical ones) - all these show strong
inclination to just war theory. Iraq is only but the last example.
In close scrutiny, justice is taking a primacy, compared with
its rivals freedom and welfare; this seems to be the ethical substance
of a political action consisting or aiming towards democratization of
the world. Justice is the leading principle in justification of new
wars, not freedom (of those who should be asked because it is their
political position and destiny at stake), nor welfare of those who are
to be “democratized”. Justice is at the root of the process of “libera-
tion” with the result of just making more deeply undemocratic, i.e.
unjust, societies. This is in accord with the perception that these wars
are just wars, the same perception which produces the feeling that
they are crusades. After all it is our justice, or our concept of justice,
we are eager to spread around.
This leads to the doctrine of pre-emptive attack. As Gentili
says: “We kill the snake as soon as we see it, even though it has not
injured us, and perhaps will not harm us. For thus we protect our-
selves before it attacks us”.3 The case of Iran comes to mind here: the
very possibility they could have nuclear weapons is taken as a seri-
ous concern and actually as a threat. But fear, which lies behind this
logic, is not enough to justify a war – and here we have another, this
time incorrect application of doctrine of non-culpable ignorance: it
would imply that a war could be justified if one is non-culpably ig-
norant that justice is not on your side (i. e. that other side in fact has
no “unjust intent”)! It would imply a decisive role of a factor like
fear: As long as one is sincere in one’s beliefs, and beliefs have some
basis, it would be enough for justification of going to war. However,
unlike defensive wars which are in a sense wars of necessity – as
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3 Alberico Gentili, The Law of War (De Jure Belli, 1598), quoted from L.
May, E. Rovie, S. Viner, The Moralitiy of War; Classical and Contemporary Rea-
dings, Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 56.
there is no question of choice after of being attacked, except to capit-
ulate immediately - in all of these other considerations we deal with
a different type of wars: wars of choice – based on judgment of their
justification in reasons which partly are reasons of justice, or are per-
ceived as such. And among them there is, in contemporary context
and in situations of supremacy we in fact have now, one striking mo-
ment, introducing a new element of asymmetry. It is strictu senso a
moral demand of just war theory (taken in its pure form) to subordi-
nate jus ad bellum to jus in bello: if a war cannot be fought justly,
then it should not be fought at all!4. As all parties always believe that
their own cause is just, yet they very often are mistaken in this judg-
ment, and the risks of fighting an unjust war in error are very much
greater for the strong – or for the disproportionately stronger side –
than for the weak, it seems that onus of the responsibility in great
deal lies more with the stronger than the weaker. This implies that
states, unlike individuals under certain circumstances, - and states-
men: leaders of countries and their elites – are not covered by doc-
trine of non-culpable ignorance, especially if they are perceived as in
advance stronger. This has a very peculiar consequence: strong ones
have no excuse in defeat. Or at least it is what justice should say.
They should cautiously assess real dangers, the ones which could
have a real impact on issues of self-defense, as “immediate and im-
minent in point of time”5, and then we would be able to discern truly
non-culpable ignorance as a validating reason from what should be
seen and taken as culpable pre-text. If this is not the case we are left
with a mere presumption of supremacy, and very little besides it.
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4 Cf. D. Rodin, ”The Ethics of Asymetric War”, in R. Sorabji & D. Rodin, The
Ethics of War, Ashgate 2006.
5 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625);
quoted from L. May, E. Rovie, S. Viner, op. cit., p. 36.
Jovan Babiæ
NESKRIVENO NEZNANJE I TEORIJA PRAVEDNOG RATA
Saetak
Teza o „neskrivljenom neznanju“ je instrument u okviru teorije pravednog
rata koja slui da se moralno opravda uèešæe u ratu za pripadnike one strane koja je
poraena; uslovi za neskrivljenost su da su poraeni borci iskreno verovali da brane
pravednu stvar i da su takoðe iskreno verovali da imaju nekih izgleda da pobede. Bez
ovog instrumenta teorija pravednog rata, jedna teorija koja opravdava rat preko
pravednog uzroka rata, bi poraenoj strani, naroèito ako je slabija, morala da unapred
pripiše krivicu što je uopšte ušla u rat. Meðutim, u savremenoj situaciji raširene kri-
minalizacije rata sam pojam rata se menja i postaje izuzetno neodredjen. Kako ratovi
postaju sve više i više „asimetrièni“, pre svega u snazi sukobljenih strana, èini se da
se teorija pravednog rata suoèava sa teškoæom da u svoje okvire uopšte situira
„neskrivljeno neznanje“, ali to povlaèi teškoæu te teorije da pokae da pravda ide sa
pobedom, otvarajuæi tako pitanje artikulacije pravednog mira.
Kljuène reèi: Teorija pravednog rata, neskrivljeno neznanje, pobeda, pra-
vedan mir.
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